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CLIMATE CHANGE: DISAPPEARING STATES, 
MIGRATION, AND CHALLENGES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL LAW* 
Sumudu Atapattu** 
“There is now little doubt that humans will be forced to adapt to the impacts 
of a warming world. There is also little doubt that the poorest people in the 
poorest countries will bear most of the burden of adapting to climate 
consequences they had almost no role in creating. As the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) has explained, “[i]n the Netherlands, 
people are investing in homes that can float on water. The Swiss Alpine ski 
industry is investing in artificial snow-making machines,” but “[i]n the Horn 
of Africa, ‘adaptation’ means that women and young girls walk further to 
collect water....”1 
-Margaux J. Hall & David C. Wiess 
 
ABSTRACT: This Article discusses two inter-related issues: the legal 
implications of climate-induced migration and the phenomenon of ‘disappearing 
states’ through the lens of four case studies, Kivalina, Inuit, the Maldives, and 
Tuvalu. As early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) recognized that the greatest single impact of climate change may be on 
human migration. With sea level rise, Small Island States face the prospect of 
losing their territory. The Article discusses the challenges that these two issues 
pose for international law. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................. 2 
II.  CASE STUDIES ................................................................... 4 
A. Case Study One: Kivalina ........................................... 4 
B. Case Study Two: The Inuit ......................................... 7 
C. Case Study Three: The Maldives ................................ 9 
* The author prepared the original version of this article for the University of 
Wisconsin Law School workshop on “Adapting to Climate Change: Devising a Novel 
Legal Framework for Climate Migration,” November 9–10, 2012. She presented it at 
the LSA Annual Meeting, May 2013, Boston, MA and at the University of  Washington 
Journal of Environmental Law & Policy Symposium: “Climate-Migration, Local 
Conditions and Law: Food Security, Land Tenure and Gender Symposium,” February 
8, 2014. The article has been revised for publication. 
** Associate Director, Global Legal Studies Center, University of Wisconsin Law School 
and Lead Counsel for Human Rights, Center for International Sustainable 
Development Law, Montreal. 
1. Margeaux J. Hall & David C. Wiess, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Climate 
Change Adaptation and Human Rights Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 309 (2012). 
1 
1
Atapattu: Climate Change: Disappearing States, Migration, and Challenges fo
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
2 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:1 
D. Case Study Four: Tuvalu .......................................... 10 
III. CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW ................. 12 
A.   The “Disappearance” of States ................................ 14 
1.  Fate of the Population ......................................... 16 
2.  Fate of Sovereign States ..................................... 18 
3. Nations Ex-situ .................................................... 20 
B. Climate Migration ..................................................... 22 
C. Proposals That Have Been Advanced ....................... 29 
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................... 34 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change poses unprecedented challenges for the 
international community and international law. There is 
scientific consensus that climate change is unequivocal and the 
human contribution to climate change is also firmly 
established.2 The consequences of climate change are far 
reaching and will affect every state in the global community, 
whether rich or poor, big or small, strong or weak. Yet, it is no 
secret that some states and communities will experience the 
adverse effects of climate change more than others. 
Specifically, Small Island States,3 low-lying cities, and poor 
and indigenous communities would suffer more than others. 
The legal response to date has focused primarily on 
mitigation.4 However, in this generation and the next, 
adaptation will play a bigger role than mitigation as the 
greenhouse gases that are already present in the atmosphere 
will continue to cause adverse consequences.5 Many forms of 
adaptation exist, and people have adapted to harsh 
environmental conditions for centuries. One form of 
2. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in 
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Basis (T.F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013) (hereinafter 
IPCC) available at: 
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/report/WG1AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf. 
3. The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) emerged as a loose coalition during 
the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. About SIDS, UN 
CONFERENCE ON SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES, http://www.sidsnet.org/about-
sids (last visited June 6, 2014). They formed themselves into the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS) mainly to lobby in relation to climate change. http://aosis.org/ 
(last visited June 6, 2014). 
4. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 
107; Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 (hereinafter UNFCCC). 
5. IPCC, supra note 2, at 27; Hall & Wiess supra note 1. 
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adaptation, albeit extreme, is migration.6 It may provide the 
only option for Small Island States, which are facing 
inundation caused by sea level rise. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
recognized, as early as 1990, that human migration could be 
the greatest single impact of climate change.7 Normally, people 
rarely migrate solely for environmental reasons, but in the 
event of inundation caused by climate change induced sea level 
rise, migration (or planned relocation) may be the only option 
available to the inhabitants of Small Island States. 
This Article discusses the phenomenon of “disappearing 
states,” climate migration, and the challenges they pose for 
international law through the lens of four case studies: 
Kivalina, the Inuit, the Maldives, and Tuvalu. Kivalina is a 
small village in Alaska. The Inuit are an indigenous group that 
spans several countries of the Arctic. Both of these 
communities are situated in the Global North. The Maldives 
and Tuvalu are Small Island Developing States. Both Kivalina 
and the Inuit resorted to legal action to seek relief for damage 
associated with climate change,8 while Tuvalu has threatened 
legal action.9 In contrast, the Maldives has taken a policy 
approach and lobbied its cause at the U.N.10 These 
communities and countries were selected to show the 
indiscriminate nature of climate change and the geographical 
range of its impacts; whole nation states as well as vulnerable 
communities in both developing and developed countries would 
6. Some argue that people resort to migration when other forms of adaptation have 
failed. See, e.g., JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); see also R. McLeman & B. Smit, Migration as an 
Adaptation to Climate Change, 76 CLIMATIC CHANGE 31 (2006). 
7. See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for 
Policymakers, in Climate Change: The IPCC Impacts Assessment 3 (W.J. McG. Tegart 
et al. eds., 1990) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-
wg1-spm.pdf. 
8. Michelle Kaminsky, Island Nations May Sue US over Climate Change, 
LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/lawsuits-settlements/more-litigation/island-
nations-may-sue-us (last visited May 19, 2014); Kalinga Seneviratne, Tiny Tuvalu 
Steps up Threat to Sue Australia, U.S., INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 5, 2002, 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2002/09/environment-tiny-tuvalu-steps-up-threat-to-sue-
australia-us/. 
9. Id. 
10. See Maldives: Climate Change Actions, MALDIVES EMBASSY TO BELGIUM AND 
MISSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, http://www.maldivesmission.eu/topics/climate-
change. 
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be affected. This Article does not intend to underestimate the 
severe impacts of climate change in other parts of the world or 
on other vulnerable communities. 
II.  CASE STUDIES 
A. Case Study One: Kivalina 
The village of Kivalina, Alaska, with its 400 residents, is 
located on the tip of a low-lying barrier island on the Chukchi 
Sea, approximately eighty miles north of the Arctic Circle.11 
The residents are primarily Inupiat Eskimo and the village 
has a maximum elevation of ten feet above sea level.12 
“According to the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE), environmental changes associated with global 
warming have exacerbated flooding and erosion threats to 
Kivalina.”13 In 2006 the USACE concluded that the situation 
in Kivalina was “dire” and the entire town must be relocated 
and estimated that it would cost between $123–249 million.14 
In 2008, Kivalina filed a lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California against 
twenty oil, coal, and electric utility corporations, arguing that 
these corporations bear responsibility for the adverse effects 
experienced by Kivalina’s residents as a result of the large 
quantities of carbon dioxide these corporations emit.15 Kivalina 
alleged a public nuisance claim under federal common law as 
well as private and public nuisance claims under California 
law. They also alleged the defendants committed a civil 
conspiracy by knowingly misleading the public about the 
science of global warming. Specifically, they alleged that the 
defendants’ individual and collective greenhouse gas emissions 
contribute to global warming, and were substantially 
interfering with the plaintiffs’ public rights to use and enjoy 
public and private property. Because the injuries are 
11. Dustin Till, Threatened by Rising Seas, Native Village Seeks Lifeline in Federal 
District Court, MARTEN LAW. (Mar. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20080326-village-seeks-lifeline. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Petition at 45, Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 
08-1138). 
4
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol4/iss1/3
2014] CLIMATE CHANGE: DISAPPEARING STATES 5 
indivisible, the plaintiffs requested that the court find the 
defendants jointly and severally liable for the damages 
resulting from public nuisance, conspiracy, and concerted 
action.16 The plaintiff’s argued that: 
While the global warming to which defendants 
contribute injures the public at large, Kivalina suffers 
special injuries, different in degree and kind from 
injuries to the general public. Rising temperatures 
caused by global warming have affected the thickness, 
extent[,] and duration of sea ice that forms along 
Kivalina’s coast. Loss of sea ice, particularly land-fast 
sea ice, leaves Kivalina’s coast more vulnerable to 
waves, storm surges[,] and erosion. Storms now 
routinely batter Kivalina and are destroying its 
property to the point that those living on Kivalina must 
relocate or face extermination.17 
Ultimately the district court dismissed the case on several 
grounds, which included the political question doctrine and 
lack of standing.18 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that federal common law of nuisance has been 
displaced by the Clean Air Act and that if a cause of action is 
displaced, it also displaces all remedies.19 It noted that “the 
Supreme Court has already determined that Congress has 
directly addressed the issue of domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions from stationary sources and has, therefore, 
displaced federal common law.”20 It further noted that the fact 
that the damage occurred before the EPA acted to establish 
greenhouse gas standards does not alter the analysis and 
concluded that federal common law addressing domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions has been displaced by Congressional 
action. The court was, however, mindful of Kivalina’s perilous 
situation: 
Our conclusion obviously does not aid Kivalina, which 
itself is being displaced by the rising sea. But the 
solution to Kivalina’s dire circumstances must rest in 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.Cal. 2009). 
19. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012). 
20. Id. at 856. 
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the hands of the legislative and executive branches of 
our government, not the federal common law.21 
Judge Pro, concurred, noting that once federal common law 
is displaced, state nuisance law becomes available unless it is 
preempted by federal law. Thus, Kivalina could pursue any 
remedies under state law to the extent they are not preempted. 
Judge Pro further noted that Kivalina had not met the burden 
of proof in this case, i.e. tracing their injuries to the 
Appellees.22 The judge pointed out that Kivalina itself has 
acknowledged that there are many thousand emitters 
worldwide and the greenhouse gases have been emitted for 
over hundreds of years. Yet, seeking to hold these particular 
defendants solely responsible may not be equitable: 
It is one thing to hold that a State has standing to 
pursue a statutory procedural right granted to it by 
Congress in the CAA to challenge the EPA’s failure to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions which incrementally 
may contribute to future global warming. . .. It is quite 
another to hold that a private party has standing to 
pick and choose amongst all the greenhouse gas 
emitters throughout history to hold liable to millions of 
dollars in damage.23 
The inhabitants of Kivalina are currently waiting to be 
relocated.24 Their condition is dire, but because there are plans 
to relocate them eventually, no effort has been made to allocate 
money to improve their current living conditions.25 For 
example, the inhabitants lack safe drinking water and 
sanitation and continue to suffer from something they did not 
contribute to.26 One may well ask, is this just? 
21. Id. at 858; see also Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: 
Creating an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 
NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (2011). 
22. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 869. 
23. Id. 
24. According to historic records, reference has been made to the need to relocate 
Kivalina as far back as 1905. Joshua Griffin, Presentation University of Washington 
Journal of Environmental Law & Policy Symposium: Climate-Migration, Local 
Conditions and Law: Food Security, Land Tenure and Gender Symposium (Feb.8, 
2014). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
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B. Case Study Two: The Inuit 
The Inuit are a linguistic and cultural group inhabiting the 
Arctic region in four countries: Russia, United States, Canada, 
and Greenland.27 They share a common culture characterized 
by subsistence harvesting of food, travel on snow and ice, and 
traditional knowledge of and adaptation to Arctic conditions. 
Unfortunately, the consequences of climate change, which are 
more pronounced in the Polar Regions than anywhere else in 
the world, threaten their traditional way of life.28 These 
threats include: (a) thinner sea ice, later freezes, and earlier 
and more sudden thaws; (b) unreliability of traditional 
knowledge regarding safety of sea ice; (c) changes in snowfall 
patterns; (d) melting of permafrost at an alarming rate; (e) loss 
of sea ice, resulting in increasingly violent storms hitting the 
coastline; (f) changes in precipitation and temperature 
resulting in sudden spring thaws that release large amounts of 
water leading to floods; and (g) weather becoming increasingly 
unpredictable.29 Moreover, increased temperatures and sun 
intensity have heightened the risk of previously rare health 
problems such as skin cancer, sunburns, and cataracts. Game 
animals’ habits are changing and they are moving to new 
locations, which pose travel problems for the Inuit people.30 
In its 2005 petition to the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference pointed out 
that although the US is the largest contributor to greenhouse 
gas emissions in the world,31 it has repeatedly declined to take 
measures to reduce its emissions.32 Increased greenhouse gas 
concentrations due to human activity have contributed to the 
27. See Beginning of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, 
http://inuitcircumpolar.com/section.php?ID=15 (last visited May 19, 2014). 
28. Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief 
from Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the 
United States at 33, available at: http://inuitcircumpolar.com/files/uploads/icc-
files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf. [hereinafter Inuit Petition] 
29. These impacts are documented in great detail in their petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights filed against the United States in 2005. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Since then China has overtaken the United States as the largest emitter. See 
China Overtakes U.S. in Greenhouse Gas Emissions, NEW YORK TIMES (June 20, 2007) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/20/business/worldbusiness/20iht-
emit.1.6227564.html. 
32. See Inuit Petition, supra note 28. 
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changes in global temperatures. These increased temperatures 
have resulted in the impacts described above which, in turn, 
have led to the violation of several of the Inuit’s human rights: 
right to life, health, culture, physical integrity, security, means 
of subsistence, right to choose one’s residence, freedom of 
movement, and inviolability of the home. Thus, the Conference 
argued that the United States is in violation of human rights 
and environmental obligations. It requested that the 
Commission make an onsite visit to investigate the harms 
suffered by the Inuit; hold a hearing; prepare a report 
declaring the United States bears internationally 
responsibility for violations of rights affirmed by the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man33 and other 
international law instruments; recommend that the United 
States adopt mandatory measures limiting its greenhouse gas 
emissions; establish and implement, in coordination with the 
petitioners, a plan to protect Inuit culture and resources as 
well as a plan for Inuits to better adapt to the impacts of 
climate change; and provide any other relief that the 
Commission considers appropriate and just. The Commission 
declined to hear the petition, but did hold a hearing on climate 
change and human rights.34 
The Kivalina and Inuit cases demonstrate the pitfalls of 
using litigation to seek relief for damage caused by climate 
change. Causation, multiple emitters, multiple sources, 
standing, remedies, and even causes of action are some of the 
obstacles these petitioners have to overcome.35 On the other 
hand, even if such cases fail to bring relief to the petitioners, 
they may have a broader impact–such litigation gives a human 
face to the problem; it brings home the fact that climate 
change is already taking place and people are already 
suffering. Such legal efforts also bring attention to the problem 
and may even influence international negotiations and 
diplomacy.36 
33. Organization of American States [OAS], Charter of the Organization of American 
States art. 3(l), Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. 
34. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to Hold Hearing on Global 
Warming, EARTHJUSTICE (Feb. 6, 2007) http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2007/inter-
american-commission-on-human-rights-to-hold-hearing-on-global-warming. 
35. See RICHARD LORD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 23–49 (Ben Boer et al. eds., 2012). 
36. See David Hunter, “The Implications of Climate Change Litigation for 
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C. Case Study Three: The Maldives 
In its submission to the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Maldives contended that 
as a Small Island State, it is especially vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change.37 Some of these impacts were 
identified as sea level rise causing permanent inundation and 
flooding; increases in sea and surface temperatures causing 
changes to island and marine ecosystems; increases in 
intensity of extreme weather events; changes in precipitation, 
which can exacerbate the effects of sea-level rise; increases in 
sea temperature causing damage to coral reefs and other 
aquatic life; increased salinity; destruction of rainwater 
storage tanks and sanitation systems; displacement of people; 
and transmission of diseases.38 
Stressing that many of their protected rights could be 
violated as a result of climate change, the Maldives articulated 
that the international community faces a dual challenge: to 
ensure that the multilateral climate change negotiations 
discuss human rights considerations and that the 
international human rights discourse incorporates climate 
change considerations.39 
The Republic of Maldives proclaimed in its National 
Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA)40 that over eighty 
percent of its total land area is less than one meter above the 
sea level, and forty-four percent of the population lives within 
100 meters of the coastline. Consequently, “the small size, 
extremely low elevation[,] and unconsolidated nature of the 
International Environmental Law-Making” in Adjudicating Climate Change: State, 
National, and International Approaches 357 (William Burns & Hari Osofsky eds., 
2009). 
37. Submission of the Maldives to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights under Human Rights Council Re. 7/23 (Sept. 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/Maldives_Submi
ssion.pdf. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. According to the UNFCCC website, “National adaptation programmes of action 
(NAPAs) provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority 
activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate 
change – those for which further delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a 
later stage.” National Adaptation Programmes of Action, UNITED NATIONS 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php (last visited June 11, 2014). 
9
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coral islands place the people and their livelihoods at very high 
risk from climate change, particularly sea level rise.”41 The 
Program states: 
The scarcity of land in the Maldives, the smallness of 
the islands and extreme low elevation makes retreating 
inland or to higher grounds impossible. Building 
setback has limited utility and beach replenishment 
may only be a temporary remedy for beach loss. Unless 
expensive coastal protection measures are undertaken 
the human settlements face the threat of inundation.42 
The NAPA also acknowledges that human pressures such as 
population increase and human intervention including land 
reclamation are aggravating the problem. While the NAPA 
deals with diverse issues (e.g. tourism, fisheries, water 
resources, food security, human health, and flood protection),43 
it fails to address the issue of relocation en masse, despite the 
fact that the Prime Minister of the Maldives had on several 
occasions referred to the need to buy land to relocate its 
people.44 In 2009, he even held an underwater cabinet meeting 
to draw attention to the issue of climate change.45 
D. Case Study Four: Tuvalu 
In his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September 
2003, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu, Saufatu Sopoanga, stated: 
“We live in constant fear of the adverse impacts of climate 
change. For a coral atoll nation, sea level rise and more severe 
weather events loom as a growing threat to our entire 
population. The threat is real and serious, and is of no 
41. National Adaptation Program of Action, Republic of Maldives (2007), 19, 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/mdv01.pdf. 
42. Id. at 22. 
43. Id. 
44. James Burgess, Maldives Buying Land in Australia as Preparation for Mass 
Migration, OILPRICE (Jan. 10, 2012, 10:43 PM) http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-
News/World-News/Maldives-Buying-Land-In-Australia-As-Preparation-For-Mass-
Migration.html; Sinking Island’s Nationals Seek New Home, CNN.COM ASIA, (Nov. 11, 
2008, 1:53 AM) http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/11/11/maldives.president/. 
45. See Maldives Government Highlights the Impact of Climate Change . . . by 
Meeting Underwater, MAILONLINE (Oct. 20, 2009, 8:44 AM) 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1221021/Maldives-underwater-cabinet-
meeting-held-highlight-impact-climate-change.html. 
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difference to a slow and insidious form of terrorism against 
us.”46 
Tuvalu, formerly known as the Ellice Islands, is a 
Polynesian island nation located in the Pacific Ocean, midway 
between Hawaii and Australia.47 It comprises three reef 
islands and six true atolls. Its population of 10,544 makes it 
the third-least populous sovereign state in the world. In terms 
of physical land size, Tuvalu is the fourth smallest country in 
the world.48 
In its NAPA, Tuvalu refers to the need to take adaptation 
measures in relation to coastal areas, water resources, 
biodiversity, agriculture, human health, and natural 
disasters.49 Like the Maldives, it too does not refer to 
relocation as an option, despite recognizing its vulnerability to 
natural disasters: 
The islands of Tuvalu rarely exceed three meters in 
height. There is no high ground on the islands to escape 
to during a tsunami or tidal wave. The combination of 
minimal land, high population density, and no high 
ground to escape to in an event of a disaster makes 
Tuvalu one of the most vulnerable nations in the world 
to natural hazards, especially in regards to rising sea 
levels and extreme events due to climate change.50 
Tuvalu, like other Small Island States, is at the risk of total 
submergence due to sea level rise associated with climate 
change. Unlike developed states, its contribution to climate 
change is negligible. Despite this, these small island states are 
at the risk of losing everything they have, including their 
territory, culture, sovereignty and the entire population. 
Several years ago, Tuvalu toyed with the idea of instituting 
legal action in the International Court for Justice (ICJ) against 
the United States and Australia.51 Currently, spearheaded by 
Palau, Small Island States are exploring the possibility of 
46. Statement by Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tuvalu, U.N. 
GAOR, 58th Sess., 10th plen. mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.10 (Sept. 24, 2003). 
47. Tuvalu, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuvalu (last visited May 15, 
2014). 
48. Id. 
49. Tuvalu’s National Adaptation Program of Action (2007), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/tuv01.pdf. 
50. Id. at 30. 
51. See Seneviratne, supra note 8. 
11
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getting the General Assembly to request an advisory opinion 
from the ICJ on the legal obligations of states in relation to 
climate change.52 
Sea level rise associated with climate change and 
subsequent inundation of low-lying states will not happen 
overnight. We may still have a small window of opportunity to 
adopt contingency plans and adaptation plans; however, the 
longer we wait, the harder it will become to plan for this 
eventuality. Moreover, these islands could become 
uninhabitable long before they become submerged. 
III. CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Climate change will pose many challenges for international 
law, some of which are demonstrated by the common strands 
that run through the case studies above: loss of land (including 
total submergence in some instances) and the disappearance of 
entire states, and the potential mass relocation of people. 
While international law has provisions on state succession, it 
does not have a legal framework for dealing with complete 
disappearance of a state because the world has yet to deal with 
this phenomenon.53 Associated with this reality is the issue of 
relocating entire populations. What happens to the population 
of a disappearing state? Where would they go? Should such 
relocation be part of an organized program of migration (for 
example, as part of adaptation plans under the U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)) or 
should this be left to the judgment of each individual? If this is 
an individual decision, displaced populations may be at the 
mercy of developed states that are responsible for causing the 
problem in the first place. As the discussion below shows, such 
displaced populations do not have any legal protection under 
contemporary international law and individuals could even 
face deportation for entering other countries illegally. If 
relocation is to be done collectively, it will require the 
52. Press Conference, U.N. News Service, Request for International Court of Justice 
Advisory Opinion on Climate Change, (Feb. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2012/120203_ICJ.doc.htm. 
53. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Climate Change and the Risk of 
Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States, 19, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/04 
(May 2011). 
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cooperation of the entire international community, or, at a 
minimum, regional cooperation. 
Apart from the populations of Small Island States, there is 
some consensus that migration of people due to consequences 
of climate change will take place around the world.54 Much of 
this migration is likely to be temporary and internal.55 In some 
instances, particularly in places like Africa where 
international borders are rather porous, cross-border 
migration is a possibility.56 In such situations, conflicts over 
scarce resources are likely to exacerbate already volatile 
situations. The next section discusses the legal ramifications of 
each of these situations, except internal migration, which is 
not governed by international law. 
54. See IPCC, supra note 2; see also Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting 
a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2009). 
55. See MCADAM, supra note 6 at 193. 
56. Movement of people across borders associated with recent conflicts in Africa is a 
good example. 
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A.  The “Disappearance” of States 
Under customary international law, an entity needs to 
satisfy four criteria to be recognized as a “state.” These criteria 
are codified in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States as: (a) a defined territory; (b) a permanent 
population; (c) an effective government; and (d) the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states.57 While recognition by 
other states is not mentioned as a criterion, it is an implicit 
requirement as the capacity to enter into relations with other 
states depends on whether an entity is recognized as a state or 
not. Recognition tends to be a political decision. 
International law does not require the territory to be of a 
particular size58 nor does it require a particular number of 
people to be present to satisfy the requirement of population.59 
According to Crawford, “although a state must possess some 
territory, there appears to be no rule prescribing the minimum 
area of that territory.”60 He further notes that there is no rule 
requiring contiguity of the territory of the State, although 
fragmentation may make independence and control difficult to 
achieve.61 Since, according to Crawford “statehood implies 
exclusive control over some territory,”62 it would seem that 
territory, however small, is necessary for statehood. On the 
other hand, there is a strong presumption against extinction of 
states once they are firmly established so the disappearance of 
territory, by itself, may not lead to a loss of sovereignty.63 
Furthermore, in the Island of Palmas case, a seminal case 
on acquisition of title to territory before the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, the Arbitrator stressed that “sovereignty is the 
right to exercise in regard to a portion of the globe. . .to the 
57. See JAMES CRAWFORD, CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45–46 (2nd 
ed., 2006); Karen Knop, Statehood: Territory, People and Government, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 95 (Crawford and Kostenniemi 
eds., 2012). 
58. See LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 256 n. 5 
(4th ed., 2001). 
59. Id. at 255 n.3 (referencing “mini states”). 
60. See CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 46 (emphasis added). 
61. Id. at 47. 
62. Id. at 48. 
63. Id. at 715. 
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exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.”64 Thus, 
by all accounts, territory plays a crucial role in relation to 
statehood and sovereignty. 
Importantly, territory does not mean only physical land. 
Under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
sovereignty extends to the territorial sea and the air space 
above that as well as over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).65 
By creating the EEZ, the Convention brought a large area of 
the sea, which was previously part of the high seas, under the 
jurisdiction of states. This was an important development with 
regard to exploitation of marine resources. By losing land 
territory, states may also lose their maritime territory and its 
resources. 
Moreover, membership in the U.N. is open to all peace-
loving “states.”66 Thus, sovereignty and statehood have 
important legal ramifications. For example, Palestine fulfills 
most of the criteria of statehood but is not a state; hence, it is 
not a full member of the UN.67 There are many other entities 
in the international community which do not enjoy full 
statehood, yet function at the international level to some 
degree: Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, the Holy See, the Vatican, 
etc.68 In contrast to disappearing states, these entities do have 
physical territory. 
What, then, is the situation if the territory disappears 
altogether? With regard to Small Island States,69 this is a real 
64. Island of Palmas Case (Neth./U.S.), 2 RIAA 829, 839 (1928). 
65. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
[hereinafter UNCLOS] 
66. U.N. Charter, art. 4. 
67. In November 2012 the U.N. General Assembly voted to upgrade the Palestine 
from permanent observer status to a “non-member observer state,” See, Press Release, 
U.N. News Service, General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine 
‘Non-Member Observer State’ Status in United Nations, (Nov. 29, 2012), available at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm. See also, John M. B. 
Balouziyeh, Palestinian Statehood under International Law, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL 
NEWSROOM (JAN. 1, 2013, 9:33 PM) 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-law-
blog/archive/2013/01/03/palestinian-statehood-under-international-law.aspx. 
68. For further information. See CRAWFORD, supra note 57, Chapters 13 and 14. 
69. According to the SIDS webpage, there are forty Small Island States, see: About 
Small Island Developing States, U.N. CONFERENCE ON SMALL DEVELOPING STATES 
http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?menu=1496 (last visited May 20, 2014). Wikipedia 
gives the number as fifty two. Small Island Developing States, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_Island_Developing_States. 
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possibility due to creeping sea level rise associated with 
climate change. Given that these islands are only a few feet 
above the sea level, even a few inches rise in sea level can have 
a huge impact. Although McAdam critiques the notion of 
sinking islands as being sensationalistic and dramatic, she 
acknowledges that these islands will become uninhabitable 
due to increased severe weather events, intrusion of salt water 
and lack of fresh water coupled with unsustainable 
anthropogenic activities.70 This raises two separate, yet inter-
related questions: first, what is the fate of the population and 
secondly, what happens to the state itself once the territory 
disappears? 
1. Fate of the Population 
Under the UNFCCC, developed countries have pledged to 
assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change with the costs of 
adaptation and direct adverse effects.71 There is no doubt that 
Small Island States fall into this category as the Preamble to 
the UNFCCC addresses Small Island States specifically.72 
Article 3 also acknowledges that those states that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change 
should be given full consideration.73 Thus, it would seem that 
developed countries, which are responsible for historic 
emissions, have an obligation to at least provide sufficient 
funds to these countries to adapt. However, in the event where 
the territory is no longer habitable, does this obligation to help 
adapt extend to facilitating relocation? 
While relocation en masse across international borders may 
not be the first option for many of the communities affected by 
climate change, in relation to Small Island States this may be 
the only option, if the state is to survive as a legal entity. After 
all, the world is faced with an unprecedented scenario.74 In 
70. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 126. 
71. UNFCCC, supra note 4, at art. 4(4). 
72. Id. at pmbl. (“Recognizing further that low-lying and other small island 
countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to 
floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous 
ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”). 
73. Id. at art. 3(2). 
74. See Maxine Burkett, The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized 
Nationhood and the Post-Climate Era, 2 CLIMATE LAW 345 (2011); Susin Park, “Climate 
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fact, it is proposed here that in order to preserve nationality, 
cultural identity, and territorial integrity, it may be better to 
relocate populations en masse, provided that this is done in a 
systematic, cooperative manner with the participation of the 
population concerned as part of adaptation plans. Additionally, 
it is proposed that individuals who do not wish to participate 
in an en masse relocation scheme and would prefer to avail 
themselves of existing labor migration opportunities should be 
given that option. This way, labeling populations as “climate 
migrants, refugees or displaced persons” can be avoided. 
However, this would require the close cooperation of every 
state, particularly those who are responsible for causing the 
problem in the first place. We could extend the common but 
differentiated responsibility principle75 to cover this scenario 
but this is unlikely to be politically very palatable. 
What is the role of the principle of self-determination here?76 
Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights espouse this right. Those 
Covenants state: “All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development.”77 Notwithstanding the significance 
of this principle, its application outside the colonial/apartheid 
context is subject to some debate. It evolved as a right of people 
in non-self-governing territories to freely determine their 
political status. Outside this context, however, its application 
Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-lying Island States,” Legal 
and Protection Policy Research Series, UNHCR (Mary 2011) at 8 (noting that “loss of 
the entire territory of a state or the exile of the entire population and government is 
without precedent”). 
75. The common but differentiated responsibility principle is incorporated in 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration. It recognizes the disparity in the global community 
and the disparate contribution to environmental problems by developed and 
developing countries. The original version of Principle 7 that sought to address historic 
responsibility for global environmental problems caused considerable controversy at 
the Rio Conference. Despite this, the CBDR principle is specifically incorporated in the 
UNFCCC and the obligations under it are based on this principle. See HUNTER ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIROMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 464 (4th ed. 2011). 
76. See MCADAM, supra note 6 at 147. 
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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is unclear.78 For example, it is not clear whether ethnic 
minorities or other groups would qualify as “peoples” and what 
the “right” to self-determination would entail.79 It must also be 
remembered that this is a collective right and not an 
individual one.80 
In the context of Small Island States, one can see the 
application of the right of self-determination in relation to a 
decision to relocate en masse, provided, of course, a suitable 
place has been offered by another state. Its application here 
should be rather uncontroversial given that the entire 
population is being asked whether they want to continue under 
the same sovereign, retaining their nationality, but on a 
different territory. Of course, problems might arise if the 
population wants to make any changes or if the state that is 
offering land lays down various conditions. It is not clear how 
these issues will be addressed because they are unprecedented 
and international law has not faced similar issues before. 
While one cannot exercise the right of self-determination to 
claim land from other states,81 given that as many as forty or 
more sovereign states would be affected, it is obvious that this 
issue cannot be dealt with on an ad hoc basis. 
2. Fate of Sovereign States 
International law does not envision a situation where states 
disappear altogether; it has rules on state succession where 
one entity will replace another or a new entity emerges, 
through cession, unification or dissolution.82 The international 
78. As Damrosch et al. note: “The international instruments referring to a right of 
self-determination of “peoples” do not make clear whether the right applies outside the 
decolonization context, and if so, how to define “peoples” entitled to exercise the right.” 
DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 58, at 273. 
79. Id. at 269. 
80. The right to self-determination is affirmed in relation to indigenous people in the 
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
81. See MCADAM, supra note 6 at 16; See also Susannah Willcox, A Rising Tide: The 
Implications of Climate Change Inundation for Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 9 
ESSEX HUMAN RIGHTS REV. 1 (2012). 
82. See CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 700–17; see also Susin Park, supra note 74, at 6 
(pointing out that there have been a few cases of extinction of states which has 
occurred in the context of succession: “The situation of low-lying island States would 
be unique in this sense, inasmuch as there would, in principle, be no successor States 
in such cases”). 
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community needs to address the legal vacuum that would arise 
as a result of states disappearing due to consequences 
associated with climate change.83 Over forty sovereign states 
are at the risk of losing their territory. Long before their 
territory disappears, however, their populations will have to be 
relocated. How the international community will address this 
issue would be crucial for the continuation of these states as 
sovereign nations. There are no uninhabited territories lying 
around—barring Antarctica84—that states can “discover” and 
“occupy.” Every available territory is under the sovereignty of 
a particular state. Even more worrying is the fact that Small 
Island States, whose contribution to climate change is 
negligible and will continue to be so, will be at the mercy of 
those states that caused the problem in the first place. This 
raises important questions about equity and the application of 
the common but differentiated responsibility principle (CBDR). 
Under the legal regime governing climate change, the CBDR 
has been applied in relation to mitigation. Can we now apply it 
to adaptation, at least with regard to Small Island States 
whose plight is becoming increasingly precarious and who will 
be at the mercy of the international community? 
The question, of course, arises as to what happens if the 
international community is not altruistic and does not provide 
territory to allow relocation en masse. What if states are 
prepared to take in citizens of Small Island States on an ad hoc 
basis, but do not allow them to retain their identity for fear of 
conflicts with their own citizens? In this situation, which 
seems to be the most likely (and realistic) scenario, the state 
could disappear when the territory disappears, along with its 
territorial sea and the EEZ. The population would lose its 
nationality, diplomatic protection (unless the recipient state 
extends citizenship) and other rights associated with 
nationality. Is this the fate of the Small Island States? If states 
were willing to sell part of their land to Small Island States 
that had enough purchasing power to buy such land, then 
there will be a fairly smooth transition to the new location, 
provided, of course, the new land could sustain their 
83. Here I am referring to the physical disappearance of states—the international 
community could decide that, legally, these entities will continue as ‘states.’ 
84. Territorial claims to Antarctica are frozen and no new claims can be made. See 
Antarctic Treaty, art. v, Dec. 1, 1959, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. 
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traditional livelihoods, customs, etc. This will be particularly 
challenging with regard to indigenous communities whose 
traditional way of life is very much dependent on the land they 
inhabit. 
The strong presumption that favors the continuity of an 
established state “suggests that acceptance of creative 
interpretations of law to recognize the continued existence of a 
state—particularly in this ‘unusual situation’—is plausible.”85 
If the presumption in international law is in favor of continued 
statehood, then is it possible to argue that existing states 
should continue even though it lacks physical territory? In 
other words, can a “deterritorialized statehood” exist?86 If 
states cannot exist without physical territory, their 
populations will become stateless people.87 
3. Nations Ex-situ 
Identifying these states as “endangered states,”88 Burkett 
proposes a legal fiction of “nations ex-situ” to deal with this 
emerging category of states that could possibly disappear as a 
result of climate change.89 She argues that: 
Ex-situ nationhood would be a status that allows for the 
continued existence of a sovereign state, afforded all the 
rights and benefits of sovereignty amongst the family of 
nation-states, in perpetuity. It would protect the 
peoples forced from their original place of being by 
serving as a political entity that remains constant even 
as its citizens establish residence in other states. It is a 
means of conserving the existing state and holding the 
resources and well-being of its citizens—in new and 
85. See Burkett, supra note 74, at 354 (positing that the phenomenon of endangered 
states “raises novel questions that may challenge the very foundation of Westphalian, 
or nation-state, sovereignty”) (footnotes omitted). 
86. Id.; see also Rosemary Rayfuse, W(h)ither Tuvalu? International Law and 
Disappearing States, UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES FACULTY OF LAW RESEARCH 
SERIES, paper 9 (2009). 
87. See U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 
360 U.N.T.S. 130 (based upon presumption against statelessness and envisaging a 
situation where people become stateless due to operation of law). See also, MCADAM, 
supra note 6, at 138–143. 
88. See Burkett, supra note 74, at 354. 
89. Id. at 345. 
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disparate locations—in the care of an entity acting in 
the best interest of its people.90 
She points out that in practice this would mean creating a 
governmental framework that could exercise authority over a 
diffuse people. Noting that others have called for the revival of 
the U.N. trusteeship system91 to administer the duties of a 
deterritorialized government, Burkett proposes “a hybrid 
structure that provides a permanent space for long-distance, 
and perhaps collaborative, governance of Nations Ex-Situ.” 92 
Thus, nation ex-situ would be a new entity which could be 
based along the lines of the U.N. trusteeship system: “The 
government of ex-situ nations would sit in a permanent 
location and manage the affairs of the state at a distance.”93 
Other scholars have argued for an “authority” that could 
continue to manage the maritime zones of the disappeared 
states for the benefit of the displaced population.94 It is not 
clear whether these maritime zones would automatically 
disappear if the territory that it is attached to disappears. 
Common sense dictates that maritime zones would disappear 
because the breadth of these zones is measured in relation to 
the land territory.95 On the other hand, it can be argued that 
these zones are created by law so they will not disappear 
automatically. Of course, the drafters of the Law of the Sea 
Convention did not envisage this scenario when it was adopted 
30 years ago. 
90. Id. at 346 (borrowing from the concept of ex-situ conservation). 
91. All territories under this system have now attained self-government or 
independence. See United Nations Trusteeship Council, 
http://www.un.org/en/mainbodies/trusteeship/. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See Rayfuse, supra note 86. However, current maritime zones are based on 
baselines that are linked to physical territory. See Charles Di Leva & Sachiko Morita, 
Maritime Rights of Coastal States and Climate Change: Should States Adapt to 
Submerged Boundaries, WORLD BANK, LAW & DEVELOPMENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, 
paper 5 (2007); Michael Gagain, Climate Change, Sea Level Rise, and Artificial 
Islands: Saving the Maldives’ Statehood and Maritime Claims through the 
‘Constitution of the Oceans,’” 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 77 (2012). 
95. UNCLOS, supra note 65. 
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B. Climate Migration 
For centuries people have migrated for environment-related 
reasons.96 Much of such migration has been voluntary. Forced 
migration and displacement is usually associated conflict. 
However, we are now faced with a new category of people: 
those who will be forced to migrate, whether internally or 
internationally, due to climate change.97 Unfortunately, 
current international law does not protect them. 
International law recognizes several categories of people and 
the legal protection accorded to them varies according to each 
category. Climate migrants do not fit within any of these 
categories. 
Nationals: For purposes of international law, nationals are 
those who enjoy the citizenship of that particular state. It is 
nationality that links the state with the individual. This link 
also triggers certain rights vis-à-vis the state, including 
diplomatic protection, protection of human rights and 
protection from external aggression.98 
Refugees and asylum seekers: Sometimes the national state 
itself becomes the aggressor or persecutor and the 
international community must step in to take the role that is 
traditionally played by the state. In the case of persecution on 
the grounds of race, nationality, ethnic origin or place of birth, 
the individual has to seek refuge in a foreign state and if that 
individual succeeds in establishing this, he/she becomes 
entitled to refugee status in the receiving state.99 This 
protection is afforded by the Geneva Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees.100 
96. See McLeman & Smit, supra note 6, at 31. 
97. The estimates of such “climate refugees” have ranged from twenty million to two-
hundred million by 2020. Compare Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees: A 
Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century, 357 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON 609–13 (2002) (two-hundred million), and David Adam, 
50m Environmental Refugees by End of Decade, UN Warns, GUARDIAN (Oct 12, 2005), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2005/oct/12/naturaldisasters.climatechange
1 (fifty million) with HUMAN TIDE: THE REAL MIGRATION CRISIS, CHRISTIAN AID (2007), 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/images/human-tide.pdf (one-hundred-and-five million). 
98. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 58, at 425. 
99. Those who are seeking such protection are referred to as asylum seekers and 
people whose status has been decided are considered as refugees. 
100. Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 2545. 
22
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol4/iss1/3
2014] CLIMATE CHANGE: DISAPPEARING STATES 23 
Internally displaced people: Sometimes people are displaced 
internally due to conflict, natural disasters, etc., but do not 
cross an international border. Such displacement is usually 
temporary but in conflict situations people have been displaced 
for years and sometimes multiple times.101 In this situation, 
they are still subject to the protection of their national state 
but since they are displaced from their home they should be 
afforded some protection. The U.N. Guiding Principles of 
Internal Displacement,102 a soft law instrument, provide 
guidance as to how such people should be treated.103 
Migrants: Those who cross an international border but are 
not fleeing persecution, civil strife, or a natural disaster are 
migrants. They are generally considered as economic migrants 
in search of better conditions of life. However, it is not always 
easy to establish a clear demarcation between economic 
migrants and others. Migration refers to the movement of 
people and is a catch-all phrase to encompass everybody who 
moves from his/her place of origin. Sometimes, of course, 
migration is not voluntary. Even if migration seems voluntary, 
when all the circumstances are taken together, migration can 
be deemed forced. 
As Professor McAdam points out, it is important to 
conceptualize migration correctly as the legal response to 
climate migration would depend on its accurate 
conceptualization.104 As the above discussion shows, the reason 
why people migrate is very relevant for the applicable legal 
regime. She identifies five questions that must be addressed in 
this regard: (a) whether the movement is voluntary or 
involuntary; (b) the nature of the trigger; (c) whether 
international borders are crossed; (d) whether there are 
political incentives to characterize it as climate migration; and 
(e) whether movement is driven or aggravated by factors such 
as discrimination.105 Given the predicted consequences of 
climate change, particularly in relation to Small Island States, 
it is likely that sizeable populations will have to be relocated to 
101. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: GLOBAL OVERVIEW 
OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 2009 (NINA M. BIRKELAND ET AL. EDS., 2010). 
102. Id. U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998). 
103. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 101. 
104. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 17. 
105. Id. 
23
Atapattu: Climate Change: Disappearing States, Migration, and Challenges fo
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
24 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:1 
less vulnerable areas. Estimating the magnitude of the 
problem is rather difficult because people rarely move solely 
for environmental reasons.106 Sea level rise, severe weather 
events and desertification coupled with poverty, lack of 
prospects and rising cost of living are most likely reasons to 
force people to move.107 Provided the international community 
is altruistic and open about welcoming citizens from Small 
Island States (other legal issues aside), problems are likely to 
arise if people start migrating from heavily populated areas 
such as Bangladesh due to their sheer numbers and possible 
cultural and religious differences in the receiving state. While 
it is likely that much of initial migration will be internal,  cross 
border migration will result where the state cannot cope with 
internal migration or where international borders are rather 
porous. 
In order to decide on an appropriate legal framework, it is 
useful here to base our discussion on the typology developed by 
Walter Kalin, U.N. Secretary-General’s Representative on the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, setting out the 
diverse scenarios that could be encompassed within 
“environmental displacement”: (a) the increase of severe 
weather events (hydro-meteorological)—movement here is 
likely to be internal and temporary; (b) government-initiated 
planned evacuations to safer areas—movement here is likely to 
be permanent and internal; (c) environmental degradation and 
slow onset disasters—this may be a trigger for people to move 
voluntarily; (d) Small Island States—where the land is no 
longer habitable, permanent relocation to other countries 
would be necessary even if the country is not yet inundated; 
and (e) displacement associated with conflict over natural 
resources—resource-based conflicts can be particularly 
challenging and where scarcity cannot be resolved, conflicts 
and displacement can be protracted.108 If one were to adopt 
this typology, the critical area for the purposes of international 
law would be scenario (d) above. However, movement across 
international borders associated with (c) and (e) above cannot 
be ruled out. 
106. See Sheila C. McAnaney, Sinking Islands? Formulating a Realistic Solution to 
Climate Change Displacement, 87 NYU L. REV. 1172, 1180–81 (2012). 
107. See THREATENED ISLAND NATIONS 7 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier 
eds., 2013). 
108. Id. at 19. 
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Most migration will be internal, temporary and gradual.109 
Migration en masse in the face of a disaster would be 
temporary even where an international border is crossed. It 
has been argued that it is not necessary to devise a legal 
regime governing “climate migrants” as existing labor 
migration schemes will be sufficient to cover them.110 This 
argument unfortunately ignores the plight of Small Island 
States and the fact that these populations will have to be 
relocated en mass at some point. 
As has been repeated often in scholarly writings, the current 
international legal regime covers only political refugees.111 The 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines 
a refugee as a person who: 
[o]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection 
of that country. . . .112 
Despite arguments to the contrary,113 by no stretch of 
imagination can this be interpreted as encompassing those 
109. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 16 and McAnaney, supra note 106. 
110. See MCADAM, supra note 6. 
111. The subject of environmental/climate refugees has attracted considerable 
literature. See generally, Myers, supra note 97; Dana Zartner Falstrom, Stemming the 
Flow of Environmental Displacement: Creating a Convention to Protect Persons and 
Preserve the Environment, 13 COLO. J. INT’L. ENVTL. & POL’Y 1 (2001); Brooke Havard, 
Seeking Protection: Recognition of Environmentally Displaced Persons under 
International Human Rights Law, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 65 (2007); MOLLY CONISBEE & 
ANDREW SIMMS, ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES: THE CASE FOR RECOGNITION (David 
Nicholson-Lord ed. 2003); Suzette Brooks Masters, Environmentally Induced 
Migration: Beyond a Culture of Reaction, 14 GEO. IMMGR. L. J. 855 (2000); Tamer Afifi 
and Koko Warner, The Impact of Environmental Degradation on Migration Flows 
Across Countries, U.N. UNIVERSITY, paper 5 (2008); Jane McAdam, Environmental 
Migration Governance, UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES FACULTY OF LAW RESEARCH 
SERIES, paper 1 (2009); CAMILLO BOANO, FMO RESEARCH GUIDE ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
AND DISPLACEMENT (2008), http://www.forcedmigration.org/guides/fmo046; Gil Marvel 
Tabucanon, Migration for Environmentally Displaced Pacific Peoples: Legal Options in 
the Pacific Rim, 30 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 55 (2012); Aurelie Lopez, The Protection of 
Environmentally-Displaced Persons in International Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 365 (2007); 
Stephen Castles, Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of the 
Debate, (U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, New Issues in Refugee Research Paper 
No. 70, 2002). 
112. See Geneva Convention, supra note 100, at art. 1. 
113. See Jessica Cooper, Note, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of 
the Refugee Definition, 6 NYU ENVTL. L. J. 480 (1998); Falstrom, supra note 111, at 22 
 
25
Atapattu: Climate Change: Disappearing States, Migration, and Challenges fo
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2014
26 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:1 
who may be displaced by climate-related events or even 
environmental events. Neither is it feasible to amend the 
definition to cover such people. Those who advocate for 
amending the Geneva Convention must take the specific 
context in which it was adopted into consideration and see 
whether the existing framework can be stretched to cover 
another category of people unrelated to the original objective 
and in a totally different context. If the international 
community is serious about protecting the category of people 
who will be displaced as a result of climate change, then it 
makes sense to do so within the legal framework governing 
climate change or adopting a separate legal regime 
altogether.114 
The African Union Convention on Internally Displaced 
Persons is the only international treaty that comes closest to 
recognizing people displaced by climate change.115 It defines 
“internally displaced persons” as: 
persons or groups of persons who have been forced or 
obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of 
habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in 
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
generalized violence, violations of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internationally recognized State border.116 
Here again, however, the event must amount to a disaster 
and the convention only covers those internally displaced. 
While recognizing and providing for a category of people 
called “climate refugees” (or whatever legal term is adopted) 
could distract attention from the urgent need to reduce 
emissions, it is important to recognize that the emissions that 
are already in the atmosphere will continue to cause adverse 
effects in the coming years, even if the international 
(refering to scholars who argue for expanding the Geneva Convention but proposing a 
separate convention). 
114. See Falstrom, supra note 111 (advocating the adoption of a separate legal 
regime); Docherty & Giannini, supra note 54; discussion infra Part III.C; Fabrice 
Renaud et al., Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration 34 (U.N. 
University, Interdisciplinary Security Connections No. 5, 2007) (arguing against 
expanding the Geneva Convention). 
115. African Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), Oct. 23, 2009, 49 I.L.M. 86. 
116. Id. (emphasis added). 
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community were to stop all emissions today.117 Thus, for the 
present generation and the next, adaptation will be more 
important than mitigation. Mitigation and adaptation must go 
hand in hand—with regard to mitigation, the international 
community is already racing against time. Their options are 
getting more and more limited and their emission reductions 
will have to get more and more drastic as the window of 
opportunity the international community has is getting 
increasingly narrower. 
Some have contested the projected numbers of displaced:118 
estimates vary from 20 million to 200 million by 2050.119 What 
is important, however, is not the exact number or the 
methodology that is adopted to count climate refugees. For, it 
is clear that no matter what methodology is adopted, the 
numbers will be in the millions, not hundreds. Although 
scholars such as McAdam have argued persuasively for 
effective in situ adaptation measures,120 they have at the same 
time acknowledged that “in the absence of adaptation and 
migration strategies, there could be widespread population 
displacement from Small Island Nations rendered 
uninhabitable as a result of climate change impacts on their 
already fragile ecosystems.”121 As Burkett points out, “Large-
scale migration of people and communities due to climate 
change may have a dramatic effect on the globe in the next 
half-century.”122 Even assuming that movement of people for 
117. See Oli Brown, Migration and Climate Change, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
FOR MIGRATION, no. 31, at 41 (2008) (stressing need to formally acknowledge the 
predicament of forced climate migrants and that a certain amount of forced migration 
is “locked in”). 
118. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 28 (referring to Norma Myer’s estimate of 150 
million displaced by the middle of this century as emblematic of the alarmist 
approach); Richard Black, Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? (U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees, New Issues in Refugee Research Paper No. 34, 2001); 
David Keane, The Environmental Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search for 
the Meaning of “Environmental Refugees,” 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (2004); see 
also Axel Bojanowski, Feared Migration Hasn’t Happened: U.N. Embarrassed by 
Forecast on Climate Refugees SPIEGEL ONLINE, (Apr. 18, 2014, 2:52 PM) 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/feared-migration-hasn-t-happened-un-
embarrassed-by-forecast-on-climate-refugees-a-757713.html. 
119. See supra note 97. 
120. See MCADAM, supra note 6, at 35. 
121. Id. at 119–20. 
122. See Burkett, supra note 74, at 348. 
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most part will be internal, temporary, and not en masse,123 one 
cannot ignore the plight of people currently living in Small 
Island States who account for about 5 percent of the world’s 
population.124 If these territories become uninhabitable due to 
climate change or related causes at some point in the future, 
we will have to relocate these people en masse.125 Already 
there are reports of a village in Fiji being relocated as a result 
of saltwater intrusion due to sea level rise.126 
How will international law deal with this situation? There 
may be many existing models to look at—protectorates, leasing 
of land, two forms of sovereigns existing together such as in 
the case of Native Americans in the US, governments in exile, 
trusteeships, etc. Legally, we may be able to come up with a 
workable framework; however, the crucial issue will be finding 
physical land to relocate people and set up a “state”. An ideal 
scenario would be where land is sold, leased or “donated” in a 
geographically similar area where people can settle down and 
continue their livelihoods that they are accustomed to. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the population 
could use this as an opportunity to free itself from shackles of 
poverty in the country of origin and seek opportunities 
elsewhere—this may mean acting individually but this is a 
possibility that one cannot rule out or exclude. If individuals 
want to explore opportunities elsewhere, they have the right to 
do so but they may not be able to avail themselves of the 
protection of their state in that situation or the state may not 
be in a position to protect them anyway. As Burkett points out, 
we may want to distinguish those who migrate from Small 
Island States from other climate migrants for several reasons: 
(a) inability to return to their homes; (b) collective migration; 
(c) predictable need for migration; and (d) a unique and 
123. See MCADAM, supra note 6. 
124. See About the Alliance of Small Island States, http://aosis.org/about-aosis/ (last 
visited May 20, 2014). 
125. As Professor Burkett points out: “For small-islanders, in particular, the perils of 
migration . . . is made worse by the loss of their state. In other words, while 
displacement within and across borders may be a compulsory journey for many 
“climate migrants,” small-islanders will be on the move absent a country — with all of 
its attendant legal, economic, and cultural markers — to which to return.” Burkett, 
supra note 74, at 348–49. 
126. See Reports: Fiji Latest Country to Relocate Climate Refugees, ALLIANCE OF 
SMALL ISLAND STATES, (Jan. 29, 2014) http://aosis.org/reports-fiji-latest-country-to-
relocate-climate-refugees/. 
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compelling moral element to their situation.127 However, some 
of these criteria, particularly (a) and (c), may be applicable in 
relation to other climate migrants too—those currently living 
in low lying areas like Dhaka, Bangladesh, would be a good 
example. Such people could cross the border into India giving 
rise to, among other things, ethnic tensions. 
C. Proposals That Have Been Advanced 
Lack of a proper definition of or a legal regime governing 
environmental/climate refugees is certainly not due to a want 
of scholarly debate on the subject.128 Rather, the field is replete 
with an overload of ideas and suggestions.129 The persistent 
problem has been to get the international community rallied 
around the need to take action. Starting from “environmental 
refugees,” a term coined by El-Hinnawi in 1995 as “those who 
have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily 
or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption 
that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the 
quality of life,”130 controversy has surrounded both the 
terminology as well as the definition. Despite the flood of 
scholarly articles and books on the subject,131 no consensus has 
so far been reached on either issue. 
127. Burkett, supra note 74, at 351. 
128. I have explored this aspect in more detail elsewhere. Sumudu Atapattu, 
Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration: Implications for International 
Law, 27 WIS. INT’L L. J. 607 (2009); see also, MCADAM, supra note 6, at Chapter 7. 
129. Climate migration has also attracted considerable literature. See generally, 
Docherty & Giannini, supra note 54; Marissa S. Knodel, Wet Feet Marching: Climate 
Justice and Sustainable Development for Climate Displaced Nations in the South 
Pacific, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 127 (2012); GEETANJALI GANGULY, CLIMATE CHANGE, 
DISAPPEARING STATES AND FORCED HUMAN DISPLACEMENT: THE DESIRABILITY AND 
MERITS OF A PROTOCOL OR CONVENTION FOR PERSONS DISPLACED BY CLIMATE CHANGE 
(2011) available at http://150.203.86.5/coast/events/environment/papers/ganguly.pdf; 
David Hodgkinson et al., Climate Change ‘Refugees’ and the Need for a Global 
Agreement, 4 PUBLIC POLICY 155 (2009); Black, supra note 118; Elizabeth Burleson, 
Climate Change Displacement to Refuge, 25 ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 19 (2010); Katrina 
Miriam Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 167 (2013). 
130. Referred to in Fabrice Renaud, Janos J. Bogardi, Olivia Dun, Koko Warner, 
Environmental Degradation and Migration, available at http://www.berlin-
institut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/handbuch_texte/pdf_Renaud_Environmental.pdf, 
who credit Lester Brown as the first proponent of environmental refugees; see also 
Knodel, supra note 129. 
131. See authorities cited in supra note 128. 
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Proposals range from expanding the Geneva Convention on 
Refugees,132 on the one hand to adopting a separate, stand-
alone convention on climate refugees,133 on the other. In 
between lies the proposal to adopt a protocol on climate 
refugees either to the Geneva Convention or the UNFCCC 
even though climate refugees do not fit neatly within either 
legal regime.134 
The Draft Convention on the International Status of 
Environmentally-displaced Persons (“Draft Convention”)135 
proposed by the Interdisciplinary Centre of Research on 
Environmental, Planning and Urban Law is the most 
elaborate effort toward such a framework. Its objective is to 
establish a legal framework that guarantees the rights of 
environmentally-displaced persons and to organize their 
reception as well as their eventual return, in application of the 
principle of solidarity.136 Each party is to protect 
environmentally displaced persons in conformity with human 
rights law. 
The Draft Convention defines “environmentally-displaced 
persons” as “individuals, families and populations confronted 
with a sudden or gradual environmental disaster that 
inexorably impacts their living conditions, resulting in their 
forced displacement, at the outset or throughout from their 
habitual residence.”137 A “sudden environmental disaster” is 
defined as “a rapidly occurring degradation of natural and/or 
132. Id. 
133. See Docherty & Giannini, supra note 54, at 350. 
134. Id. at 50. 
135. The Draft Convention on the International Status of Environmentally-displaced 
Persons (2010), available at 
http://www.cidce.org/pdf/Draft%20Convention%20on%20the%20International%20Stat
us%20on%20environmentally%20displaced%20persons%20%28second%20version%29.
pdf. 
136. Id. at art. 1. Solidarity is an emerging principle and encompasses an amalgam 
of existing principles: of cooperation, peaceful co-existence and humanitarian 
assistance. According to the UN Human Rights Council, “international solidarity is not 
limited to international assistance and cooperation, aid, charity or humanitarian 
assistance; it is a broader concept and principle that includes sustainability in 
international relations, especially international economic relations, the peaceful 
coexistence of all members of the international community, equal partnerships and the 
equitable sharing of benefits and burdens.” U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 18/5, 
U.N. Doc A/HRC/18/L.12, (Sept. 23, 2011). 
137. Id. 
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human origin,”138 while a “gradual environmental disaster” is 
defined as “a slow, progressive or planned degradation of 
natural and/or human origin.”139 It further defines “forced 
displacement” as “any temporary or permanent displacement 
made inevitable by environmental disaster, either within a 
State or from the State of residence to one or more receiving 
States, of individuals, families or populations.”140 
According to the Draft Convention’s Article 9, all persons 
confronted by a sudden or gradual environmental degradation 
have the right to move within or outside of their home state. 
The Article places an obligation on states not to hinder such 
displacement. It is interesting to compare this right with the 
right to choose one’s residence and the right not to be 
displaced.141 The draft convention further guarantees the right 
to water, housing, food, healthcare, work, culture, religion and 
education. It thus guarantees both civil and political rights and 
economic, social, and cultural rights recognized under 
international law. It provides that such displaced persons have 
the right to return when their place of origin is habitable and 
that they have the right to retain the nationality of the state of 
origin affected by an environmental disaster. It places 
obligations on the host state to facilitate their naturalization, if 
requested, and to not prosecute them if they enter the host 
country illegally. 
This raises important issues related to migrants work status 
in host countries. Usually, people who are forced to migrate 
and certainly those who enter a country illegally (whatever the 
reason is) are not allowed to work in the host state. While 
basic humanitarian assistance is usually accorded to such 
people, the right to work and education are not available. This 
provision represents a derogation from this common practice 
as it envisages that migrants are entitled to request 
naturalization in the host state and the host state has an 
obligation to facilitate it; naturalization carries with it the 
right to work. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. See Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to be Displaced, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 689 (1994). 
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The draft convention embodies both positive and negative 
components. The definition of environmentally displaced 
persons refers to environmental disasters, whether they are 
sudden or gradual. It is unlikely that sea level rise associated 
with climate change amounts to an “environmental disaster.” 
Moreover, the definition of a gradual degradation refers to “a 
slow, progressive or planned degradation of natural and/or 
human origin.” It is not clear what action or event would 
amount to planned degradation of the environment. The Draft 
Convention lays down an elaborate institutional framework to 
implement its provisions including the establishment of a 
national commission on environmental displacement in each 
signatory state, a High Authority to hear appeals from the 
national commission, a World Agency for Environmentally-
Displaced Persons (WAEP), and a conference of parties. 
Parties would be required to submit national reports to the 
Secretariat to be established under the proposed framework. 
In addition, it envisions the establishment of a World Fund for 
the Environmentally-Displaced (WFED) that would be 
supported by voluntary contributions as well as a mandatory 
tax based on the causes of sudden or gradual environmental 
disasters that give rise to environmental displacement. 
While the proponents of the draft Convention have invested 
considerable time and thought in it, a closer look reveals 
several flaws: not only is the definition of an environmentally 
displaced person hard to implement, but the Convention would 
require an enormous commitment of resources from the host 
states, including provision of basic rights and needs, as well as 
providing free interpreters and translators. These new 
institutions would create additional costs on an already 
burdened bureaucracy in many countries. All of these issues 
raise the question whether there will be any political support 
for the adoption of such a convention. The economic and 
political stakes of ratification seem very high, particularly 
since the numbers of such displaced persons could run into 
thousands, if not millions. The main issue, however, is that 
this framework will not cover those currently living on Small 
Island States as the Draft Convention envisions the eventual 
return of these displaced populations to their homes when such 
return in possible. By not confining this to climate refugees, 
the drafters seem to opt for a more inclusive approach. 
However, it may prove to be rather unwieldy if every 
environmental disaster triggers mass migration. Others have 
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sought to distinguish between three categories of people: (a) 
environmentally motivated migrants; (b) environmentally 
forced migrants; and (c) environmental refugees.142 
Biermann and Boass, on the other hand, have proposed that 
those who are displaced by climate change should be treated 
differently due to their special character.143 They define 
“climate refugees” as: “people who have to leave their habitats, 
immediately or in the near future, because of sudden or 
gradual alterations in their natural environment related to at 
least one of the three impacts of climate change: sea-level rise, 
extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity.”144 
These proponents restrict the application of climate refugees 
to three direct impacts of climate change: sea level rise, 
extreme weather events, and drought and water scarcity.145 
They also exclude four categories of impacts from a possible 
definition: (i) climate impacts that have only a marginal link 
with forced migration; (ii) forced migration as a result of 
measures taken in relation to mitigation or adaptation; (iii) 
migration due to other factors such as industrial accidents or 
natural disasters unrelated to human activities; (iv) migration 
due to indirect impacts of climate change such as conflicts over 
natural resources.146 Biermann and Boass’ definition thus 
highlights one of the problems with defining climate 
refugees—it is difficult to establish the causal link between the 
event and climate change—extreme weather events such as 
flooding, prolonged droughts are a good example. While there 
is recognition that climate change will give rise to severe 
weather events both in relation to the frequency and the 
severity,147 it is not possible to identify climate change as the 
sole cause.148 Furthermore, there is also recognition that 
climate change will give rise to water and food scarcity,149 
which could lead to conflicts over these resources resulting in 
142. See Renaud et al., supra note 129, at 1–9. 
143. See Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boass, Preparing for a Warmer World: 
Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, at 25–30 (Global 
Governance Working Paper No 33, 2007). 
144. Id. at 8. 
145. Id. 
146. Id.; see also Atapattu, supra note 128. 
147. See IPCC, supra note 2. 
148. See Black, supra note 128, at 12–14; Lopez, supra note 103. 
149. See Biermann & Boass, supra note 142, at 11. 
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forced migration in some instances. It is unfortunate that, 
according to this definition, such people will not fall into the 
category of climate refugees and, therefore, unable to benefit 
from the proposed legal framework. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Climate change poses unprecedented challenges to the very 
core of the international legal order, threatening the 
foundations of international law. Nation-states, sovereignty 
and the gamut of rights and privileges that emanate from the 
notion of sovereignty will be threatened as a result of climate 
change, particularly in relation to Small Island States which 
are especially vulnerable to these consequences. Whatever may 
be the uncertainties related to climate change and climate 
migration, one thing is clear: the people of these endangered 
states cannot be left to fend for themselves alone simply 
because a vacuum exists in relation to their legal status. The 
international community should use this as an opportunity to 
design a new legal regime in relation to the various challenges 
posed by climate change. The international community may 
have to depart from the traditional notions of statehood, 
populations, sovereignty and nationality and devise a legal 
regime to govern those who will be displaced because their 
territory became submerged or because they were forced to 
migrate due to climate change. Whether they are called 
“nations ex situ,” “endangered states,” “states in exile” or 
“deterritorialized states,” a legal solution will have to be found 
to accommodate their new status.150 As Burkett points out: 
Climate change takes us to a legal frontier. In other 
words, novel scenarios push current legal fields to their 
extensive margins, and force consideration beyond their 
existing boundaries. Further, notions of consistency and 
finality, like the state-territory link, are increasingly 
moribund. . ..Yet, it is probable that the emerging legal 
architecture for climate change will contain overlapping 
150. See Michael B. Gerrad & Gregory E. Wannier, supra note 107, who point out: 
“It is our moral duty as a society to prevent anthropogenic climatic change to the 
extent that we can and to help these threatened nations cope with the climate change 
that will occur despite our best efforts.” Of course, it is questionable whether we made 
our best efforts but it is clear that these states require the help of the international 
community. 
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instruments, specific to the circumstances of disparate 
peoples and environments. . ..The law would do well to 
embrace layers and inter-linkages — that is the essence 
of its successful transformation. Indeed, chasing 
coherence discourages experimentation in lawmaking, 
exactly what may be needed in the endangered-states 
context — and what will be a core element of post-
climate governance.151 
 Although we may still have a window of opportunity to 
work on the issue of “endangered states” and their citizens 
collectively, the longer we wait, the harder it will become to 
get buy-in from states to devise a legal regime. However, 
considering our experience with climate change 
negotiations, the outlook is not very promising. As we 
continue the game of political finger pointing, can the 
international community afford to sit and wait for 
sovereign nations to be submerged leaving their 
populations stateless, landless and resourceless? Is this the 
legacy that awaits the Small Island States? 
 
151. See Burkett, supra note 74, at 373. 
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